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Abstract
The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing 
October 18-24 2017. Leading up to the congress there was intense speculation 
concerning the new line-up of the most important leadership bodies of the 
CPC: the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. Would the Politburo 
Standing Committee (PSC) continue to consist of seven members, or would it 
be expanded to nine members, as was the case during Jiang Zemin's era, or 
would it instead be reduced to ﬁve members, as was the case during the late 
1980s? Would unwritten rules such as '68 down, 67 up' be observed? Or would 
veteran leaders such as Wang Qishan (69) continue to serve on the committee? 
Would Xi Jinping pack the Politburo and the PSC with his own close allies, or 
would he try to achieve a factional balance observing the interests of former 
leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao? There was also much speculation 
concerning Xi Jinping's status. Would the 'Chairman of Everything' have his 
name and thought written into the CPC Constitution alongside that of Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping and ahead of his two immediate predecessors?
Xi Jinping's report to the Party congress was also awaited with much 
interest. Such a report is usually a long document setting out the Party's 
priorities and policy objectives for the next five-year period. Would Xi 
Jinping's report signal new policy initiatives, and would it outline strategic 
guidelines reaching beyond 2022? This article examines these questions 
and assesses the future impact of the Party congress on Chinese politics.
Characteristics of the New Politburo Standing 
Committee 
The day after the conclusion of the Party congress, when the Central 
Committee met, it was revealed that the new PSC would consist of 
Secretary General Xi Jinping, Prime Minister Li Keqiang, Head of the 
Central Committee's Central Ofﬁce, Li Zhanshu, Vice Prime Minister 
Wang Yang, Head of the Central Committee's Policy Research Ofﬁce, 
Wang Huning, Head of the Central Organization Department, Zhao Leji, 
and Party Secretary in Shanghai, Han Zheng (see Table 1). It was decided 
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to maintain a PSC consisting of seven members and it was decided not 
to change the rule of '68 down, 67 up'. Consequently, Xi Jinping's close 
ally Wang Qishan (69) had to step down, even though there had been 
much speculation that he might stay on and be promoted to Chairman 
of the National People's Congress or perhaps even replace Li Keqiang 
as Prime Minister.
Except for Wang Huning the new leadership is characterized by 
provincial experience. Li Zhanshu has worked as Party Secretary in 
Guizhou, Wang Yang has served as Party secretary in both Chongqing 
and Guangdong, Zhao Leji in Qinghai and Shaanxi, and Han Zheng was 
appointed Party secretary in Shanghai after having served as mayor for 
a number of years. Both Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang had long careers in 
Chinese provinces before moving to the centre in 2007. The new team 
members are also characterized by having served several periods in the 
Politburo. Thus, the practice of promoting Politburo members to the 
PSC according to seniority has been observed once more.
In terms of age, the new members are between 60 and 67. Zhao Leji 
(60) is the youngest and Li Zhanshu (67) the oldest. Three members − 
Wang Huning, Wang Yang and Li Keqiang − are 62 and can, together 
with Zhao Leji, be appointed for a new ﬁve-year period in the PSC 
at the 20th Party congress in 2022 without violating the age rule. The 
average age is 62.9 which is slightly lower than the average age of 63.4 
for the Standing Committee elected at the 18th Party congress in 2012 
(Brødsgaard 2012a).
New Members of the Politburo Standing Committee
Xi Jinping is still ranked number one in his capacity as general sec- 
retary of the CPC. At the 19th Central Committee's First Plenary Ses-
sion immediately following the conclusion of the Party congress, he 
was re-elected chairman of the Central Military Commission. At the 
forthcoming meeting of the National People's Congress in March 2018, 
he will without doubt be elected to another ﬁve-year term as president 
of the PRC.  Since the 18th Party congress in 2012, Xi has managed to 
consolidate his power by moving allies into key provincial and central 
Party and state positions. Even though the intense anti-corruption 
campaign has allegedly targeted corrupt elements in the Party, there is 
no doubt that the campaign has also been used by Xi Jinping to purge 
political adversaries.1 Being 64 years of age, Xi Jinping should step 
down at the 20th Party congress in 2022, if the '68 down, 67 up' rule 
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is followed. Since Wang Qishan has now observed this rule, there is 
no precedent for Xi Jinping to break with the unwritten age limit for 
membership of the PSC.
TABLE 1: The Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo  
(25 October 2017)
Name Positions Age
Xi Jinping CCP Secretary General, Chairman of CMC, President 64
Li Keqiang Premier of State Council 62
Li Zhanshu Director of the General Ofﬁce of the Central Committee 67
Wang Yang Vice Premier 62
Wang Huning Director, Policy Research Ofﬁce of the Central Committee 62
Zhao Leji Secretary of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission 60
Han Zheng Party Secretary, Shanghai 63
Note: Positions as of 25 October 2017.
Li Keqiang has also kept his ranking as number two in the Party 
hierarchy. This will secure him another ﬁve-year term as prime minis-
ter. During the preceding congress period, Li Keqiang has often been 
characterized as a weak prime minister. Normally the head of the State 
Council is in charge of economic policy and the formal leader of the 
Central Leading Small Group of Financial and Economic Work, but 
Xi Jinping has taken this position and has placed his close associate in 
economic affairs Liu He as head of the leading small group's administra-
tive ofﬁce. Before the congress it was even rumoured that Wang Qishan, 
who is widely regarded as an able economic planner, might replace Li 
Keqiang. However, demoting Li Keqiang would upset the factional bal-
ance in the upper echelons of the Party and cause political instability, 
so Xi Jinping refrained from taking such drastic action.
In the new standing committee, Li Zhanshu is ranked number three 
and is in line to become Chairman of the National People's Congress.2 
Li Zhanshu has served as Head of the Central Committee's General 
Ofﬁce since 2012. He replaced Ling Jihua who occupied this position 
during Hu Jintao's tenure, but was forced to step down due to a scandal 
involving attempts to cover up his son's fatal car accident in the spring 
of 2012.3 As head of the Central Committee's General Ofﬁce Li Zhanshu 
has functioned as Xi Jinping's de facto chief of staff and is thought to be 
a close ally of the general secretary. He was also member of the Party 
secretariat of the 18th Central Committee and was appointed Direc-
tor of the General Ofﬁce of the National Security Commission, which 
was established in late 2013. Li previously served as Party secretary in 
Guizhou province (2010-2012) and has the provincial background and 
experience that tend to be a sine qua non for making it to the top in 
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Chinese politics. Li studied at the Shijiazhuang Institute of Commerce in 
Shijiazhuang City, Hebei (1971–72). Later he received an undergraduate 
education in politics from Hebei Normal University, through part-time 
study and night school education (1980–83). He also studied economics 
in a correspondence programme at the Central Party School (1992-94). 
He attended the graduate programme in business economics at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1996–98) and received an EMBA 
from the Harbin Institute of Technology in Harbin (2005–06), both on 
a part-time basis. 
In terms of factional afﬁliations Li is clearly close to Xi Jinping. The 
friendship between the two goes back to the early 1980s when Xi served 
as Party secretary of Zhengding county in Hebei and Li Zhanshu served 
as Party secretary in Wuji county in the same province. Both counties 
are administratively part of Shijiazhuang county. Li Zhanshu turned 
67 this year and will not be eligible for re-election to the PSC at the next 
Party Congress.
Wang Yang is ranked fourth among the seven members of the PSC. 
He has extensive provincial leadership experience, having served as 
Party Secretary of Chongqing (2005-07) and then Guangdong (2007-
2012). Since 2013, he has worked in Beijing as vice premier in charge of 
agricultural work.  His early career took place in the Chinese Commu-
nist Youth League (CCYL) and he was deputy secretary of the CCYL 
Anhui Provincial Committee (1983-84) before becoming executive vice 
governor of Anhui province at the age of only 38. While working in the 
Youth League in Anhui he developed close links with Hu Jintao who at 
the time was head of the CCYL. Since then he has been widely believed 
to be a member of the Youth League faction in the CPC.  During his stint 
in Guangdong province he developed a reputation for being a reform-
oriented and liberal leader. He was a strong candidate for a member-
ship of the PSC elected in 2012, but was passed over in favour of older 
and more orthodox members of the Politburo. Wang Yang has studied 
political economy as well as public administration at the Central Party 
School in Beijing and later, via part-time study (1993-1995), he received 
a master's degree in management science from the University of Science 
and Technology in Hefei, Anhui. He received additional cadre training 
at the Central Party School. His position as number four in the top hier-
archy of the Party would normally make him an obvious candidate to 
become chairman of the Political Consultative Conference.  However, it 
is rumoured that he might instead take up the position of executive vice 
premier. This would reduce the political importance of the chairman of 
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the Political Consultative Conference. Wang is only 62 and would be 
eligible for a new ﬁve-year term at the next Party Congress.
Wang Huning is ranked ﬁfth in the new leadership line-up. Wang 
Huning has served in the Central Policy Research Centre of the CPC, 
since 2002 as Director.4 He is also director of the Central Ofﬁce of Central 
Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform which was 
formed after the Third Plenary Session in November 2013. Before he 
was brought to Beijing by Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinhong in 1995, he 
made a career in international politics at Fudan University. He served 
as Professor and Chair of the Department of International Politics 
(1989-94) and ﬁnally as Dean of the Law School (1994-95). He has been 
a visiting scholar at the University of Michigan and the University of 
California at Berkeley (1988-89). Unlike other members of the PSC, he 
has no high-level provincial political and administrative experience 
and has primarily advanced his career through think-tank work.  Also 
unlike other members of the PSC, Wang Huning has a paper trail indi-
cating his ideological and policy orientation. He is known to promote 
'neo-authoritarianism' and centralization of power for the purpose of 
stronger implementation control. He has successfully served three gen-
eral secretaries and formulated the theoretical justiﬁcation for important 
concepts such as 'three represents' and harmonious society and for Xi 
Jinping's thought on 'socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new 
era'. He was originally a member of Jiang Zemin's 'Shanghai Gang', but 
is now expertly balancing his factional afﬁliations. Wang is poised to 
take over Liu Yunshan's positions as executive secretary of the Party 
Secretariat and president of the Central Party School.  It is unusual for 
an intellectual and academic to rise so high in the Chinese political 
system. Wang is 62 and would be eligible for another term in the PBSC 
when the 20th Party Congress convenes.
Zhao Leji is an interesting number six. Unlike Wang Huning, he has 
extensive provincial experience, working his way up the political-ad-
ministrative hierarchy in Qinghai to eventually become Governor and 
Party Secretary of the province. In 2007, he was transferred to Shaanxi 
province, where he served as Party Secretary during Hu Jintao's second 
term. In 2012, he was transferred to Beijing to take up the position of 
Head of the Central Organization Department. This department is in 
charge of the nomenklatura system and manages appointments for about 
4,000 positions at vice-ministerial level and above in the Party, govern-
ment, state-owned enterprises and other key institutions and organiza-
tions (Brødsgaard 2012b). In his position as head of this department, he 
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has overseen the promotion of Xi Jinping's protégés. He has now been 
appointed the new Head of the Central Discipline Inspections Commit-
tee and has replaced Wang Qishan as the head of the anti-corruption 
campaign. Zhao Leji was a 'gongnongbing' (worker-peasant-soldier) 
student at Peking University in 1977-80 and received an undergraduate 
degree in philosophy. On a part-time basis, he also attended graduate 
programmes in banking at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(1996-98) and politics at the Central Party School (2002-05). Zhao Leji 
is clearly close to Xi Jinping and a key member of the so-called 'Shaanxi 
Gang' which also counts Li Zhanshu among its members. At 60 years of 
age, he is the youngest of the current PSC members and is eligible for 
a new ﬁve-year term at the next Party congress.
Han Zheng is the most junior person in terms of rank in the new PSC. 
Throughout his career Han Zheng has worked in Shanghai, mostly in 
government and Party positions. This governmental career has only 
been interrupted by two short periods in management positions in rub-
ber plants in Shanghai. He served as mayor in Shanghai for nine years 
(2003-12) before being appointed as Party Secretary when Xi Jinping 
left Shanghai to become member of the PSC of the 17th Party Congress. 
In Shanghai, he has worked with important Party ﬁgures such as Wu 
Bangguo, Zeng Qinghong, and Yu Zhengsheng, who all later became 
members of the PBSC. He is widely believed to be a member of the 
'Shanghai Gang'. In terms of education he has attended a two-year 
programme at Fudan University in Shanghai (1983-85) and undertook 
a part-time undergraduate degree in politics at East China Normal 
University. He also graduated with a master's in international political 
economy from this university. Due to his position as number seven in 
the PSC he probably will be appointed executive vice premier at the next 
meeting of the National People's Congress in March 2018. However, it 
is rumoured that he may in fact become head of the Chinese Political 
Consultative Conference, leaving the vice premiership to Wang Yang. 
Han Zheng is 63 and will not be eligible for a new term, when the 20th 
Party Congress meets in 2022.
Consensus and Factional Balance
The composition of the new PSC indicates an attempt to align the in-
terests of various veteran leaders and their political networks. Wang 
Yang is associated with the Youth League and is close to Li Keqiang 
and the former general secretary Hu Jintao. Han Zheng is part of the 
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'Shanghai Gang' headed by Jiang Zemin, and Wang Huning owes his 
career to his afﬁliation with Jiang Zemin, who brought him to the Party 
centre in Beijing. Only Li Zhanshu and Zhao Leji are Xi Jinping's men 
and are key members of his factional network. It is also interesting to 
note that there are no clear successors to Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang in 
the new standing committee. None of them have the right age to serve 
for two ﬁve-year terms when Xi Jinping supposedly steps down in 
2022. However, four of them are eligible to be appointed for a new ﬁve-
year period as PSC members. It may also be noted that the educational 
proﬁle of the PSC has changed. During Jiang Zemin's era, all standing 
committee members were engineers. During Hu Jintao's era, engineers 
were still in the majority in the top leadership. Now economists are the 
most numerous among standing committee members (Li Keqiang, Li 
Zhanshu, Han Zheng), but there is also one political scientist (Wang 
Huning), one member with a master's in management science (Wang 
Yang) and even one member with a degree in philosophy (Zhao Leji). 
Xi Jinping has a master's degree in chemical engineering, but his PhD 
is in Marxist law. Several have received their higher education through 
part-time study, supplemented by graduate programmes and cadre 
training at the Central Party School.
The New Politburo
At the ﬁrst plenary session of the 19th Central Committee held the day 
after the conclusion of the Party congress, 15 new members were elected 
to replace those members of the Politburo that had to retire due to age 
requirements. The average age of the new members is 62.4 compared 
to 61 in 2012. New members include several regional leaders, such as 
the Party secretaries of Bejing (Cai Qi), Tianjin (Li Hongzhong), Jiangsu 
(Li Qiang), Liaoning (Li Xi), Xinjiang (Chen Quanguo) and Chongqing 
(Chen Min'er). Some of these were only recently appointed provincial 
leaders. Cai Qi, for example, was not even member of the Central Com-
mittee when in May 2017 he was appointed Party secretary in Beijing, 
and Chen Min'er only moved to Chongqing in July 2017, following the 
purge of Sun Zhengcai.
Other new members of the Politburo include Ding Xuexiang, the dep-
uty director of the Central Committee's General Ofﬁce; Huan Kunming, 
the executive minister of the Central Propaganda Department; Wang 
Chen, vice chairman of the NPC;  Liu He, vice minister of the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and director of the ofﬁce 
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TABLE 2. Composition of the Politburo of the 19th Central Committee 
of the CCP (25 October 2017)
Name Age Position
Xi Jinping 64 Secretary General, President, CMC Chair
Li Keqiang 62 Premier of State Council
Li Zhanshu 67 Director, General Ofﬁce of the Central Committee
Wang Yang 62 Vice Premier
Wang Huning 65 Director, Policy Research Ofﬁce of the Central Committee
Zhao Leji 60 Secretary of CCDI
Han Zheng 66 Party Secretary, Shanghai
Ding Xuexiang 55 Deputy Director, General Ofﬁce of the Central Committee
Li Qiang 58 Party secretary, Jiangsu
Li Hongzhong 61 Party secretary, Tianjin
Huan Kunming 61 Executive vice minister, Central Propaganda Department
Xu Qiliang 67 Vice Chairman of the CMC
Sun Chunlan (f) 67 Minister, United Front Department
Wang Chen 67 Vice chairman, National People's Congress
Liu He 66 Vice minister, NDRC
Chen Xi 62
Executive vice minister, CCP Central Organizational 
Department
Hu Chunhua 54 Party Secretary, Guangdong
Chen Quanguo 61 Party Secretary, Xinjiang
Zhang Youxia 67 Vice Chairman of the CMC
Guo Shengkun 63 Minister of Public Security
Li Xi 61 Party Secretary, Liaoning
Chen Min'er 57 Party Secretary, Chongqing
Yang Jiechi 67 State Councillor
Cai Qi 61 Party Secretary, Beijing
Yang Xiaodu 58 Minister of Supervision
Source: Author's database.
Note: Positions at the time of appointment. Politburo Standing Committee members in grey 
shadow. 
of the Central Leading Group for Finance and Economics;  Yang Jiechi, 
state councillor and former minister of foreign affairs; Yang Xiaodu, 
minister of the Ministry of Supervision; Chen Xi, executive minister of 
the Central Organization Department; Guo Shengkun, minister of the 
Ministry of Public Security; and PLA general Zhang Youxia, director of 
the PLA General Armaments Department. Three members were not re-
elected even though they were eligible in terms of age. They include vice 
president Li Yuanchao; minister of propaganda Li Qibao, and former 
Party secretary of Xinjiang province, Zhang Chunxian.
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There has already been some reshufﬂing of leadership positions. 
Ding Xuexiang has been appointed new head of the Central Commit-
tee's General Ofﬁce; Huan Kunming is the new minister of the Central 
Propaganda Department and Chen Xi is the new minister of the Central 
Organization Department. Li Qiang has left Jiangsu to become Party 
Secretary in Shanghai following Han Zheng, and Li Xi has been moved 
to Guangdong to replace Hu Chunhua, who is currently waiting for a 
new appointment, possibly as vice premier.
There are some interesting proﬁles among the new Politburo mem-
bers. Liu He, for example, is a key ﬁgure in economic policy planning. 
He works closely with Xi Jinping as director of the General Ofﬁce for the 
Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs. He gradu-
ated in economics from Renmin University in Beijing and also holds a 
Masters degree in public administration from the Kennedy School at 
Harvard University. Yang Jiechi is the ﬁrst former foreign minister and 
international relations expert to be elected as a member of the Politburo 
since Qian Qichen, who was a member of the 14th and 15th Politburo of 
the CPC. Chen Xi is a close personal friend of Xi Jinping and his former 
roommate at Tsinghua University. He has now been promoted to head 
the Central Organization Department and has also been appointed to 
the CPC secretariat. The placement of Chen Xi in these key positions, 
combined with Zhao Leji's appointment to head the Central Disciplinary 
Inspection Commission, will ensure Xi Jinping's control over personnel 
issues in the CPC.
 Guo Shengkun is a former head of China Aluminium Corporation 
and is an example of how leaders of large SOEs are integrated in the 
Chinese power system by way of the cadre rotation system (Brødsgaard 
2012c). In 2004, Guo was transferred to Guangxi to serve as deputy Party 
secretary and later Party secretary. In 2012, he became minister of Public 
Security. Other former business executives who are making a career 
in Party and government include Zhang Qingwei, former president of 
China Aerospace and current Party Secretary of Heilongjiang; Ma Xin-
grui, also former president of China Aerospace and current governor 
of Guangdong; and Zhang Guoqing, former CEO of China Northern 
Industries and current mayor of Chongqing. Some of them may advance 
to become members of the Politburo in 2022.
Chen Min'er was transferred from Guizhou in July 2017 to replace 
Sun Zhengcai as Party secretary of Chongqing. Since this appointment 
would almost certainly secure him a seat on the Politburo, the trans-
fer caused widespread speculation that Chen Min'er was Xi Jinping's 
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preferred candidate to succeed him as Party leader. Chen Min'er has 
spent most of his career in his native Zhejiang and climbed the career 
ladder to become vice governor of Zhejiang before he was transferred 
to Guizhou in 2012 to become deputy Party secretary and later Party 
secretary. During his time in Zhejiang he became closely associated 
with Xi Jinping. Aged 57 he is young enough to take over when Xi steps 
down. However, he did not make it to the standing committee, which 
would jeopardize the rule that new standing committee members are 
selected from within the Politburo.
Hu Chunhua was another candidate for inclusion in the standing 
committee. Hu Chunhua, also called 'Little Hu', was widely assumed 
to be Hu Jintao's top candidate to become general secretary. He is a 
member of the Youth League faction and in fact served as ﬁrst secretary 
of the CCYL Central Committee before becoming governor of Hebei 
province in 2008, Party secretary of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
in 2009, and Party secretary of Guangdong province in 2012. Aged 54 
he was a perfect choice if the Party leadership wanted to observe the 
unwritten rule that the chosen successor must be groomed during a 
ﬁve-year congress period before taking over as general secretary for a 
ten-year period. When Sun Zhengcai, also aged 54, was purged, it was 
an indication that this rule might no longer apply. Following the Party 
congress Hu Chunhua was replaced as Guangdong Party secretary by 
Li Xi. Since no corruption charges have been levelled against him, he 
will presumably be promoted to vice premier. Given the importance 
of Guangdong, transferring him to head a new province would imply 
a demotion.
There is a third member of the new Politburo who is the right age 
to succeed Xi Jinping. This is Ding Xuexiang, Li Zhanshu's executive 
deputy director in the General Ofﬁce of the Central Committee and 
director of the Ofﬁce of the General Secretary. He was Xi Jinping's chief 
of staff in Shanghai and he followed Xi to Beijing in 2007. Ding Xuxiang 
made his career in Shanghai and has worked for Han Zheng and the 
outgoing standing committee member from Shanghai, Yu Zhengsheng. 
He has also been secretary of the CCYL Committee in Shanghai. These 
experiences and afﬁliations would make Ding Xuexiang an ideal con-
sensus candidate for current and former top Party leaders, including 
Hu Jintao and Jiang Zeming. Ding Xuexiang is 55 years of age and the 
second youngest after Hu Chunhua in the new Politburo.
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Xi Jinping's People
Whereas the composition of the PSC reﬂects consensus among compet-
ing factions, the new Politburo is dominated by Xi Jinping's allies. Since 
members of the PSC are usually promoted from the Politburo, this will 
provide Xi the opportunity to form a PSC primarily consisting of his 
close supporters and allies in 2022. 
All four major, provincial-level cities − Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Chongqing − continue to be represented in the Politburo, indicating the 
political signiﬁcance of these megacities. Chen Min'er in Chongqing, Cai 
Qi in Beijing and Li Hongzhong in Tianjin all belong to Xi's network 
and the replacement of Han Zheng in Shanghai will undoubtedly also 
be one of his close associates.5 The economic powerhouse of Guang-
dong and the strategically important Xinjiang also regained their seats 
in the Politburo.  In the case of Guangdong, Hu Chunhua may soon be 
replaced by someone closer to Xi.
Important central Party departments such as the Central Organiza-
tion Department, the Central Propaganda Department, and the United 
Front Department are still represented on the Politburo, whereas only 
two ministries have sufﬁcient political clout to be represented by their 
ministers, Guo Shengkun of the Ministry of Public Security and Wang 
Xiaodu of the Ministry of Supervision.6  In the case of the latter, his 
role as deputy director of the CPC's Central Disciplinary Inspection 
Committee has probably been the main argument for electing him to 
the new Politburo.
Xi Jinping enters the Party Constitution
Since his election to general secretary of the CPC in 2012, Xi Jinping 
has acquired so much power that many observers have dubbed him 
the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng, and possibly since Mao. 
With this in mind, it was anticipated by most observers that Xi Jinping 
would get his name into the Party constitution. The way it was done, 
however, was surprising. The straightforward way would have been 
with a reference to 'The Four Comprehensives' that has been step-wise 
developed under Xi and promoted accordingly. Instead Xi's name en-
tered the constitution with a link to Deng Xiaoping's old and inherently 
pragmatic ideological guideline: 'Socialism with Chinese Character-
istics'. This means that the full line of CPC guiding ideology is now: 
'Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the 
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Theory of Three Represents, the Scientiﬁc Outlook on Development, 
and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for 
a New Era' (Xinhua 2017a).7
What is also striking is the fact that Xi's ideological contribution is 
listed as a 'Thought'. Ideologically speaking, this brings Xi's contribution 
on par with 'Mao Zedong Thought' even though 'socialism with Chinese 
characteristics' – the main content of Xi Jinping Thought - is actually 
Deng's invention. Yet, the fact that the label 'Thought' is applied sends an 
unequivocal signal of Xi's control of the Party and indicates his pivotal 
role for politics in China even beyond the next ﬁve years. Beyond the 
political discourse this similarity with Mao's standing is also an easily 
recognizable signal that will work to cement Xi's outstanding position 
in the eyes of ordinary Chinese.
How then are we to understand Xi Jinping Thought? In terms of 
content, it is explained through eight points that make clear the overall 
means and ends, and as many as 14 fundamental principles that include 
upholding party leadership, deepening reform, law based governance, 
upholding core socialist values, improving people's livelihood, ecologi-
cal civilization, national security, contributing to global development 
and maintaining the international order. These principles include 'The 
Four Comprehensives' but are broader and more encompassing. In fact, 
Xi Jinping Thought seems to be so all-encompassing that it becomes 
difﬁcult to see what new guidance it actually provides. 
A comparable perspective to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao's previous 
contributions highlights some of the main differences in terms of politi-
cal and organizational impact (Holbig 2009). Jiang Zemin's 'Theory of 
Three Represents' enabled an important re-organization of the CPC by 
including private entrepreneurs. This shift was crucial for the CPC's 
ability to include an increasingly important segment of society – private 
businessmen – in the Party and thereby avoid the establishment of a 
powerful interest group outside the party. Hu Jintao's 'Scientiﬁc Outlook 
on Development' provided a much-needed change in the economic tra-
jectory towards a more sustainable type of development (Christensen 
2013). This marked the start of China's green agenda with, for instance, 
a massive surge in investments in renewable energy. Seen in relation 
to these two previous contributions to the Party's ideological base, Xi 
Jinping Thought is not in any way as concrete or policy-oriented. It of-
fers no new means and offers only light revisions of the old ones. 
Instead 'Xi Jinping Thought' designates a coming era, which is a new 
ideological twist in the sense that both Mao Zedong Thought and Deng 
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Xiaoping Theory were signifying a totality of past achievements, but 
not a period as such. The personal name tag is therefore for the ﬁrst 
time linked to a speciﬁc – and even future – period and not granted 
in retrospect with reference to past accomplishments. With respect to 
the use of periods in the Party ideology we can see how it has been an 
integral part of the CPC's goal setting since the 12th Party congress in 
1982. Here, Deng announced that China should quadruple the annual 
industrial and agricultural output by the end of the millennium (Thomp-
son 2009).8 However, China reached this milestone three to four years 
ahead of schedule and was thus left in a 'periodic limbo' until the 16th 
Party congress in 2002 where Deng Xiaoping's old vision of reaching 
a moderately prosperous (xiaokang) society was re-announced with a 
2020 target date. It is this periodization to which Xi Jinping Thought is 
now linked. 
The new era of 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics' that we are 
now said to enter will also conﬁrm a new role for China on the interna-
tional stage. In fact, the new era is directly linked to a growing pride in 
China as a model for other nations: 
[s]ocialism with Chinese Characteristics has kept developing, blazing a 
new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers 
a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their 
development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese 
wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems of mankind 
(Xinhua 2017b). 
This type of externally-oriented conﬁdence in China as a model to 
emulate for other countries is new in the Party ideology. When seen in 
the context of increasing assertiveness in the foreign policy posture and 
role as initiator (most notably of the Belt and Road Initiative and Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank) that Xi has already promoted, it adds 
up to a very mature and conﬁdent China ushering in a new era on the 
world stage. And given the lack of new policy guidelines and measures 
in Xi Jinping Thought, this conﬁdence in the Chinese model could very 
well be one of its most important features.   
Xi Jinping's Report to the 19th National Congress
Xi Jinping's report is a lengthy document (66 pages) with several im-
portant ideological and developmental guidelines. These include the 
outline of Xi Jinping Thought (as explained above), but also a change in 
the 'primary contradiction', new goals for China's future development, 
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and several statements that enable us to assess the economic implica-
tions of this 19th National Congress.  
The report presents a change in the 'primary contradiction of the 
Chinese society,' which has the potential to be a very signiﬁcant change 
in the ideological base of the Party. The primary contradiction prior to 
the Party congress was between the 'needs of the people' and China's 
'backward social production'. This primary contradiction stood for 36 
years and at the time of its introduction it reﬂected a fundamental shift 
in the focus of the Party where Deng managed to release China from the 
shackles of class struggle. After the 19th Party congress, however, the 
primary contradiction is now described as being between unbalanced 
and inadequate development' and the 'people's ever-growing needs for a 
better life'. The 'needs of the people' are now described with more sophis-
tication as 'needs for a better life,' and more signiﬁcantly the 'backward 
social production' is replaced with the tension arising from 'unbalanced 
and inadequate development'. To appreciate the signiﬁcance of the 
change we can view it as a shift from a focus on 'growth at all cost' to 
a much more nuanced conception of balanced development. This type 
of development takes into consideration the often-conﬂicting aims of 
environmental protection, health, social fairness, growth, increasing 
energy consumption, etc. In other words, this is a China that is about to 
struggle with the same set of trade-offs as developed countries. 
However, the change in primary contradiction not only signals a new 
political orientation, it will also function as a new source of legitimacy for 
the CPC's policy-making. This double role of the primary contradiction 
reﬂects the often tautological way in which the CPC explains China's 
development trajectory by pointing to a continuous need to do what 
is required to keep up with the times (a destined history), and thereby 
hide the fact that the CPC has actually charted that course itself. This 
mechanism is now updated and ready for the next chapter in China's 
modernization. To be a little more concrete, we could for instance specu-
late that this shift in primary contradiction will have an impact on the 
future evaluation criteria for high-level Party members under the no-
menklatura. In this way, the hitherto strong focus on economic progress 
would be supplemented with other more broadly deﬁned criteria.
Launch of New Targets
One of the most distinct features of the CPC's ideological work is the use 
of long-term goal-setting. The 19th Party Congress will, in this respect, 
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stand out as signiﬁcant because of the launch of a new 2050 vision and 
− perhaps more importantly − the milestones in between. First of all, 
the report points out that the few years until 2020 will be dedicated to 
'ﬁnishing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects'. 
This milestone will then be reached right at the point where the CPC 
can also celebrate its centenary. Secondly, the goal of building a fully 
modern socialist country by 2050 was proclaimed. To get there, two 
phases running from 2020 to 2035 and 2035 to 2050 respectively were 
listed with speciﬁc socio-economic milestones. It is important to take 
stock of the ﬁrst, upcoming phase:9
• China's economic and technological strength has increased signiﬁ-
cantly. China has become a global leader in innovation.
• The rights of the people to participate and to develop as equals are 
adequately protected. The rule of law for the country, the govern-
ment and society is basically in place. Institutions in all ﬁelds are 
further improved; the modernization of China's system and capacity 
for governance is basically achieved. 
• Social etiquette and civility are signiﬁcantly enhanced. China's 
cultural soft power has grown much stronger; Chinese culture has 
greater appeal. 
• People are leading more comfortable lives, and the size of the mid-
dle-income group has grown considerably. Disparities in urban-
rural development, in development between regions, and in living 
standards are signiﬁcantly reduced; equitable access to basic public 
services is basically ensured; and solid progress has been made 
toward prosperity for everyone. 
• A modern social governance system has basically taken shape, and 
society is vital, harmonious and orderly.
• There is a fundamental improvement in the environment; the goal 
of building a Beautiful China is basically attained. 
The breadth and depth of this 2035 blueprint is signiﬁcant and the 
level of ambition for what has to be achieved is notable. The relatively 
short time horizon also prompts immediate action. 
In the second phase, from 2035 to 2050, China will build on the basic 
modernization achieved in the previous phase and will aim to meet the 
following targets: 
• New heights are reached in every dimension of material, political, 
cultural and ethical, social and ecological advancement. 
• Modernization of China's system and capacity for governance is 
achieved.
94 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 35(2)•2017
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Nis Høyrup Christensen _____________________________
• China has become a global leader in terms of composite national 
strength and international inﬂuence.
• Common prosperity for everyone is basically achieved. 
• The Chinese people enjoy happier, safer and healthier lives. 
With these targets met, China will have become a fully modern (social-
ist) country right at the point where the People's Republic of China 
can celebrate its centenary. The importance of this kind of numerology 
might be lost on a Western audience, but should not be underestimated 
as a driver for the CPC. 
Economic Implications
The overall impression of a historically strong leader obviously enables 
a better chance of implementing the proposed and ongoing reforms as 
laid out in the 60 Decisions Economic Reform Program launched at the 
Third Plenum in 2013. This is important because reforms within areas 
like labour reform, competition policy, cross-border investment policy 
and ﬁscal policy reform are currently lagging behind (Asia Society 
2017).10 The ongoing supply-side structural reforms to cut over-capacity, 
deleverage, and invest in new technology industries will continue and 
is now written into the Party Constitution. 
Interestingly, the report not only reiterates the commitment to 'deepen 
reform,' it also calls for a commitment to break through the blockades of 
vested interests.11 Such a blunt statement is indicative of the problems 
China's long-heralded reform pace has faced in later years. 
The report also provides important insights into the envisioned role 
of the state sector. On the one hand, we are promised further reform of 
SOE's along well-known lines like developing mixed-ownership struc-
tures as well as structural adjustments and reorganization. On the other, 
we ﬁnd calls for further support for state capital in becoming stronger, 
doing better and growing bigger. The ﬁnal aim is to build world-class 
competitive Chinese companies. What is evident from these statements 
is the seemingly paradoxical nature of the orientation of reform. This 
suggests that the continuities will far outweigh the revisions and that 
the role of SOEs as vehicles for Beijing's global ambitions still prevails. 
This is a role that has gathered momentum with the launch of the Belt 
and Road Initiative. 
Relatedly, foreign investors are promised a signiﬁcant ease of market 
access and, speciﬁcally, a change in regulations featuring a negative list 
for market access. For instance, service sectors are mentioned as targets 
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for further opening. It is furthermore stated that foreign investors will 
be protected and all businesses treated equally. While there remains 
ample room to push ahead in these areas, the concomitant strengthen-
ing of state capital will prove a signiﬁcant barrier to how far the equal 
treatment can actually go. We can therefore expect incremental steps 
rather than a complete turnaround on past practices. 
It is also interesting to note how the report calls for 'full play' to the 
strategic guidance of national development plans on the one hand, and 
repeats the plea from the Third Plenum to let the market play a decisive 
role in the allocation of resources on the other. When seen in relation 
to the lack of explicit break with the industrial policy-making featuring 
strategic sectors, state subsidies, and state policy banks, as well as no 
direct downgrading of the hitherto pivotal role of the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission, it is obvious that the retreat of the state 
will at best be incremental.  
While the above mostly points to incremental steps, it should be 
stressed that on the macroeconomic level the change in primary con-
tradiction actually holds signiﬁcant potential for a reorientation of the 
economic policies and, as mentioned, a less growth oriented perspective. 
In a broad sense, this means that the ideological base now makes up a 
much stronger platform for carrying out the projected rebalancing of 
the economy. 
Conclusion
The 19th Party congress took place in an orderly fashion without the 
open and dramatic power struggle that characterized the 18th Party 
congress. A new PSC was elected, and consisted of experienced senior 
Party leaders. Unwritten rules concerning retirement age were observed 
and Wang Qishan stepped down accordingly. The composition of the 
new PSC reﬂects consensus politics and an attempt to balance factional 
interests, whereas the composition of the new Politburo to a much higher 
degree reﬂects Xi Jinping's political and personal preferences. The suc-
cession issue was left unresolved and in the coming congress period 
this will stimulate speculation as to whether Xi might stay on, either as 
general secretary or in some other dominant role after 2022.
By writing Xi Jinping and his thought on 'socialism with Chinese 
characteristics for a new era' into the Party constitution, the Party has 
elevated Xi to a position on par with Deng and perhaps Mao. This signals 
continuity and stability, and ensures an impression of revolutionary 
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legitimacy for Xi Jinping's rule. The new era will last for more than 30 
years until 2050, when the People's Republic of China has celebrated 
its centennial. The organizational and ideological force to successfully 
achieve this goal remains a strong and centralized CPC in the eyes of 
Xi Jinping and his associates.
The 19th Party Congress in no way presaged a return to basic eco-
nomic and political reform. On the contrary, the clear message is that 
'the Party must be everywhere'.  Xi Jinping may be likened to Deng 
Xiaoping but in terms of their views of the role of the Party, there are 
clear differences. Deng Xiaoping sought to restrict the role of the CPC 
rather than involve the Party in matters that might be better handled 
by government, business or social organizations. Xi Jinping is engaged 
in micromanagement, Deng Xiaoping was not.
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NOTES
1  For a more detailed discussion of the career background of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, 
see Brødsgaard (2012a): 61-73.
2  The following biographical information is mainly based on Zhongguo renwu nianjian 
2016; the online individual China vitae; a series of biographies of new Politburo 
Standing Committee members posted online by John L. Thornton Centre at Book-
ings Institution, Washington, as well as the authors' database.
3  He was later purged and in July 2016 sentenced to life in prison. See Heilmann 
(2017:185).
4   See also Patapan and Wang (2017).
5  Following the Party Congress Li Qiang, Party secretary of Jiangsu, was transferred 
to Shanghai, to replace Han Zheng and Li Xi, Party secretary of Liaoning, was 
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transferred to Guangdong to replace Hu Chunhua.
6  After the Party congress Guo Shengkun was appointed Party secretary of the Political 
and Legal Affairs Commission. It is reported that he will be replaced as minister of 
Public Security by Zhao Kezhi, former Party secretary of Hebei, who is not a member 
of the Politburo. 
7  Xinhua 2017a. 'Full text of resolution on amendment to CPC Constitution,' Xinhua 
News Agency. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702726.htm. 
Accessed November 2017.
8  Thompson, Drew 2009. 'Beijing's GDP Numerology,' Foreign Policy. Available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/03/10/beijings-gdp-numerology/. 
9  Xinhua (2017b). 'Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC National Congress,' 
Xinhua News Agency. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/
Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.
10  Asia Society (2017). The China Dashboard. Available at  http://chinadashboard.
asiasociety.org/china-dashboard/.
11  Xinhua (2017b). 'Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC National Congress,' 
Xinhua News Agency. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/
Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.
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